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December  9  - 11,  1984 I  would first of all like to say how  very grateful 
I  am  to the Missouri  Governors  Conference  for  the warmth 
of its hospitality,  for the excellence of its conference 
organisation and  for giving me  this opportunity to share 
a  few  thoughts with you  on  a  topic not only of vital im-
portance to 8  million European  farmers  and their families 
and  to  270 million European  consumers but  a  topic also 
with considerable implications  for American agriculture. 
I  refer,  of course,  to the subject of European agri-
culture, its aims  and  philosophies,  the outlook for its 
future,  to its place in international trade  and its impact 
on  farming  here in the  "Show  l-ie"  State. 
Anyone  from  Europe  who  goes  about and  speaks in the 
United States quickly realises that mentioning the Euro-
pean  Community's  farm policy does  not always  lead to a 
burst of wild  and enthusiastic cheering  from  the back of 
the hall.  But  I  don't usually allow this to put me  off. 
So  let me  start by describing the  aims  of our  farm policy 
and  why  it looms  so large in the  Community's  thinking and 
in its spending  and where it has got to. 
I  don't know  whether the objectives of  US  agricultural 
policy are set out in your Constitution,  but they most 
certainly are in ours  :  in Article  39  of the Treaty of 
Rome.  And  they are  : 
.;. 
1. - to increase productivity through technical 
progress  ; 
to give the farmer  a  fair standard of living  ; 
- to assure  the supply of sufficient food at 
reasonable prices,  and 
- to stabilise markets. 
These  goals are closely linked with and  iri  some  cases 
are the very reasons why  our agricultural policy has  always 
been  and,  indeed,  remains  a  central feature of the Communi-
ty's activity.  That it should continue to occupy  such  a 
large part of the Community's  time  and  a  relatively 
large part of its spending is perhaps surprising to an out-
sider when it is clear that farming's  share of both Europe's 
employment  and of its economic output is steadily decreasing. 
The  reasons for this are both numerous  and  complex but there 
are four  basic factors  : 
First,  the political importance in most,  if not all, 
member  states of the concept of the family  farm  as  the  em-
bodiment of certain social values,  an appreciation shared 
by many  parties from  the left to the right of the political 
spectrum. 
Secondly,  the  acceptance by all member  states of the 
need  for intervention in the agricultural sector,  because 
of the desire on  the  one  hand  for security of food  supplies 
for consumers,  and  on  the other hand  for protection of the 
.  f  .  lt  1  d  .  violent..l  .  ~ncomes o  agr~cu  ura  pro ucers  aga~nst  I  r  uctuat~ons 
of market prices.  In this respect,  the  aims  of the CAP, 
as set out in Article  39  of  ybe  Treaty of Rome,  and  which 
./. 
2. I  described earlier, are not so different from  those of 
other industrialised countries such as  the United States 
and Japan. 
Thirdly,  the existence of  a  common  market for agri-
cultural products,  in parallel with the  common  market for 
industrial goods,  was  part of  the original political pact 
to reconcile the agricultural interest of France  and  the 
industrial interest of Germany.  With  a  free  flow of agri-
cultural products between member  states,  common  prices and 
common  rules for  intervention in the agricultural markets 
imply common  finance,  and  thus it is that the budgetary 
cost of agricultural price support has  been fully trans-
ferred  from  the national to the Community  level. 
~'  but not least, is the failure  so far of the 
Community  to develop  common  policies and  common  decision-
making in other  sectors to the  same  extent as in agricul-
ture. 
It is for this last reason that agriculture takes  such 
a  relatively large share of our budget. 
Very broadly,  the objectives of the Treaty have  been 
achieved  by fixing  common  prices for  the major part of 
our  farm production.  Some,  but by no  means all, of these 
prices are at higher levels than those in other countries. 
But,  assurance of  supply like any  insurance policy costs 
money.  And  the European consumer is prepared to pay this 
small  premium for  foo~ security.  For many,  security has as 
./. 
3. much  to do with food  as it has with missiles.  And  here, 
let me  add that the  CAP  should not be  looked at in a 
purely economic context but against a  social and political 
background as well since,  as  I  think  I  have  already im-
plied,  we  believe that the well-being of agriculture is 
essential to the  fabric  of rural life. 
But when  I  say the consumer is willing to pay  a  small 
premium,  I  am  not indulging myself in typical British 
understatement.  A regular survey of retail food prices 
published by  USDA  shows  in fact that out of  a  recent shop-
ping list of  15  items,  11 of  them were  cheaper in Paris 
than in Washington.  The  11 included roasting pork,  butter, 
cooking oil, milk  and  sugar  and  not exotic items  such as 
truffles or frogslegs. 
Let us  now  look briefly at what the effects of achieving 
these objectives have  been  - both inside and  outside the 
Community. 
We  are frequently accused  by our critics of  spending limit-
less sums  of money  to encourage our farmers  to produce 
enormous  surpluses which are then off-loaded onto world 
markets  by means  of unfair subsidies.  Indeed,  I  get the 
distinct impression that there is a  feeling here on this 
side of the Atlantic that the  US  is something of a  victim 
in farm  and  food  trade,  surrounded  by  powerful  and  devious 
competitors backed  by bountiful treasuries who  selfishly 
take advantage of  honest  law abiding Americans  depriving 
them of their rightful place  on  the world market. 
./. 
4. But let us  again examine  some  facts  and background 
and start with a  fiction which is very easily exploded -
that of the  EC  spending limitless sums  of money  on agri-
culture. 
First,  the total Community  budget for  1983  and which 
represented less than  1%  of  Community  GNP  amounted to 
some  $23  billion.  Not our deficit,  Mr.  Chairman,  but 
our total budget.  Of  this,  $15  billion - an all time 
record  - was  spent on agriculture.  All developed coun-
tries support their agriculture in some  way  and  here in 
the  US  expenditure reached almost  $19  billion and  $30 
billion if PIK  is included.  Or,  in other words,  twice 
the expenditure  for about one quarter the number  of far-
mers  we  have  in Europe.  Furthermore,  and  I  will return 
to this later, we  have  recently taken  - and  aim to take 
some  more  - tough  and  far reaching decisions to cut agri-
cultural support. 
And,  unlike all national governments  that I  know  of, 
there is a  rigid limit strictly enforced by our Member 
States as to the  amount  we  can  spend,  since our Constitu-
tion forbids us  the arguable  advantage of running  a  deficit. 
Second.  As  a  result of  the  support we  give our farmers, 
our wheat production,  for example,  increased by  29%  over 
the pre-PIK decade  - slighlty more  than the world average 
./. 
s. of  27%.  The  increase in the u.s.  was  73%  and  a  lot of that 
in soft wheat  - much  of it grown here in Missouri.  This 
latter increase was  2~ times  the world  average.  I  say this 
in no  accusatory  sense,  but in an  attempt to set the record 
straight.  Furthermore,  the increase in Community production 
was  achieved  through higher yields on  an acreage that has 
remained virtually unchanged  for the last ten to fifteen 
years. 
As  to the  impact of  the  CAP  and  our much  criticised ex-
ports refunds  on world markets,  just three points of essen-
tial clarification.  Since  some  of our more  vocal  and  less 
well  informed critics are at pains to spread the word  that 
agricultural export subsidies are the invention of cunning 
Europeans,  the work  of the devil and,  what is more,  break 
international trading rules. 
First.  Yes,  it is a  fact - and  a  very visible one  - that 
we  give export refunds.  These  compensate for  the difference 
between the world market price and  our internal price - when 
this is higher - and  are part of the cost of maintaining 
farmers  incomes. 
Se£ond  and  I  cannot underline this too strongly,  inter-
national trading rules formalised in the GATT  (the General 
Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade)  to which both the  EC,  the 
US,  Japan and  90  or so other nations are signatories,  spe-
cifically permit the use of export refunds or subsidies, 
.;. 
6. provided they are not used  to gain more  than an equitable 
share of the market,  nor to undercut the going price. 
We  maintain,  and  trade statistics support our view,  that 
we  have kept to these rules. 
Third,  other exporters of  farm products use  export 
subsidies.  The  us,  for example,  in addition to supporting 
its agriculture at home  pretty generously over recent 
years,  also deploys  a  panoply of export aids  - GSM-102, 
PL-480,  Blended Credits and  plain unvarnished  subsidies. 
For example,  I  read in one  of USDA's  excellent publica-
tions the following  : 
"In 1983,  Egypt bought  1  million tons of US  wheat 
flour at a  subsidized price of only  $136  per ton, 
about one-third below the average world market 
price."* 
I  offer these observations not to score easy points,  but 
simply to register the fact that agricultural subsidies 
are a  feature  of life in the modern world,  and  perhaps we 
are all - or most of us  - sinners in the eyes of the Lord. 
I  cannot,  however,  resist the observation that actions 
such as this macho  initiative in Egypt do not  seem to me 
to conform with the international trading rules to which 
I  referred a  moment  ago. 
But before  I  leave  th~ question of the effect of the 
CAP  on agricultural trade,  let me  just say this.  That in 
spite of  achieving security of  supply in a  number of basic 
./. 
USDA  "Middle East and North Africa", April 1984 
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7. products  - one of the Treaty's important aims  you will re-
member  - we  remain  the largest importer of food  and agri-
cultural products  in the world  and  the US  remains  the 
leading exporter.  I  hear a  great deal in Kansas  City and 
St.  Louis  of the need  to protect the United States reputa-
tion as  a  reliable supplier - and rightly so,  but it seems 
to me  that the  Community is a  very reliable customer.  We 
import about one quarter of  the world's total farm  imports  -
and  in hard cash.  And  in fiscal  83  took over  7  bio  $  worth 
of goods  from American  farmers  - more  than you  sold to Japan 
or to the whole of South America. 
Of particular interest to Missouri  should be  the fact 
that in that same  year out of total US  soyabean exports of 
24~ mio t, the  EC  took  10 mio  or  41%,  and out of your total 
soyabean meal exports of nearly  6~ mio t, we  took over  4  mio  t 
or  65%.  Our  huge  purchases of these  two  items  alone were 
worth over  3  bio  $  and made  a  significant contribution to 
our massive  farm  trade deficit with the us.  I  single out 
these  two  particular items  since they are not only your  two 
biggest exports to us  but I  understand that after two States 
beginning with "I",  whose  names  I  can't recall for  the moment, 
Missouri is the US's biggest exporter of  soyabeans  and pro-
ducts  - 630  mio  $  in 1983.  And  also because your State 
plays host in the city with the  shining arch to the American 
Soybean Association  - a  body ever mindful  of its dependence 
on  the European market. 
.;. 
a. I  referred a  few  moments  ago to the  importance which 
we  in the Community attach to the preservation of the 
fabric of rural life.  But this should not be  taken to imply 
that it is a  goal  to which we  aspire regardless of cost. 
Indeed,  our policy has neither led to a  vast and  over-
blown agricultural population nor to a  feather bedding of 
those who  earn their living on the  land.  Over  the last 
twenty years,  the EC's agricultural labour force  has dropped 
by more  than  50  percent from  19  million to 8  million.  That 
meant  the  loss of one  job every minute in European farming. 
As  to farm  incomes  - these  have  fallen since  1975 well below 
those in industry. 
So,  all is not milk  and  honey  down  on  the  farm but there has 
certainly been  too much  of the former  and  of  some  other 
products. 
Thoseof  you  who  follow developments in Europe,  if only 
through your  newspapers,  will be well  aware  of the  serious 
challenges we  currently face.  On  the agriculture front,  we, 
and  indeed other major producers,  are basically faced with 
the  same  problem  :  that of producing  larger quantities than 
markets  can absorb which,  of course,  is far from  being the 
same  as  saying that there is too much  food  in the world. 
Who  could possibly say  such a  thing with the news  from 
Ethiopia in mind  ? 
And  so,  whilst  I  strongly believe that the  CAP  is one 
.;. 
9. of  the major  achievements of the  European Community,  it 
must - like any other institution or policy, if it is to 
survive  - and  survive it will - adapt itself to changing 
conditions. 
In the  Community,  the CAP  has  to a  large extent been 
the victim of its own  success.  The  technical advances 
and  productivity gains  sought in Article  39  have  meant 
that output has risen more  rapidly than consumption.  We 
have  achieved self-sufficiency in a  number of products 
and  have  reduced our dependence  on  imports.  In other 
cases,  the  Community  has  become  a  net exporter.  But,  a 
responsible one,  supporting the principle of price sta-
bilisation agreements  and,  in spite of  strong internal 
pressures to do  otherwise,  building up  our  stocks to un-
precedented levels.  Furthermore,  in spite of achieving 
security of supply in a  number  of  important farm products  -
we  have  seen our overall agricultural trade deficit grow 
by  more  than  60%  from  $14  bio in 1973  to  $23  bio in 1982. 
Productivity increases  have  also led to a  serious im-
balance of supply  and  demand  in Europe  - with milk  as  the 
most glaring example  - as  the underlying trends of pro-
duction and  consumption went on their divergent ways. 
Increases in the volume  of total agricultural production 
have  averaged  between  1~ and  2%  over recent years whilst 
consumption has only risen by about  ~%. 
./. 
10. At  the  same  time,  we  started to run very  low on  cash -
in spite of the fact that our farm expenditure represents 
only about  ~% of our GOP.  From  1974  to 1979,  expenditure 
on  supporting agricultural markets  grew at 23%  per year -
almost twice  the rate of  growth in our revenue.  For the 
next two  or three years  - 1980  to 1982  - expenditure re-
mained fairly stable,  largely because prices remained 
relatively high on world markets.  But since then expen-
diture has  increased sharply and  rose by about  30%  in 1983. 
As  I  said earlier - our Community constitution for-
bids us to run  a  budget deficit.  So,  for the first time 
we  were  up against our financial limits. 
This chilling fact coupled with that of production 
outpacing consumption was  the  background against which the 
Commission proposed and  the Council of Ministers - that 
is to say national Ministers  from  our ten Member  States -
in a  rare act of political courage,  adopted last spring 
an essential and very  tough battery of measures for the 
rationalisation of our agriculture. 
Time  does not allow me  to describe in any detail 
the full range of measures which will hit European farmers 
and their families  and which will demand  substantial sacri-
fices  from  them.  But recent demonstrations by European 
farmers,in England  and France,  for example,  leave little 
doubt that they are being  squeezed. 
./. 
11. 12'  .  . 
Briefly the decisions reached in March  can be 
summarised under six main points  : 
1.  confirmation of the principle of guarantee thresholds,  and 
their extension to other products  1 
2.  strict control of milk production by means  of quotas  1 
3.  a  return to the unity of the market,  through the dis-
mantling of monetary compensatory  amounts  1 
4.  tough policy for prices  1 
s.  streamlining  of aids  and  premiums  for various products  1 
6.  observance of Community  preference. 
Let me  flesh out four of those six main  elements 
guarantee  thresholds,  the action on milk,  prices and 
Community  preference  : 
Fi£st,_Gua£antee_Thr~s~o!d~: 
We  in the Commission have  been insistently warning  the 
Council of Ministers for the last 4  years - and  I  quote 
from  what we  said in 1980 - that 
'in the present state of agricultural technology, it is 
neither economically sound nor financially feasible to 
guarantee price or aid levels for unlimited quantities'. 
We  argued that the Community  had  passed the level of 
self-sufficiency for many  major products,  and while pro-
duction was  continuing to rise,  the increase in  co~sumption 
was  practically nil.  In these circumstances, we  said that 
.;. there should be  'producer coresponsibility above  a  certain 
level of production - that is,  a  first stage in which 
Community responsibility would be total,  and  a  second 
in which it would be  shared  between the Community  and 
producers'. 
In the following years,  this idea was  refined  by  the 
development of the  'guarantee threshold'  concept.  This 
term indicates the predetermined level of farm production 
beyond which producers  have  to share financial responsi-
bility.  In 1982,  the Council introduced thresholds for 
several products  {milk,  cereals,  colza and processed 
tomatoes)  in addition to those where  analogous measures 
already existed  (sugar  and cotton).  The  level of these 
thresholds naturally differed according to the products, 
as did the steps to be  taken in the event of their being 
exceeded but,  in general,  they consisted of  a  cut, direct 
or indirect, in the price or aid for the product in 
question.  In its March  1984 decisions the Council not 
only extended  thresholds to further products  (sunflower 
seed,  durum wheat  and dried raisins)  but,  in an  important 
political declaration,  accepted the Commission's guide-
lines for guarantee thresholds,  and emphasised the ad-
visability of  introducing them for products in surplus 
or on which expenditure is likely to increase rapidly  • 
.  /. 
13. Se_£ond.L  ~ilk.!_ 
The  milk sector, with its grave  imbalance  between  supply and 
demand,  had to be at the centre of  any plan for  reform of 
the CAP.  As  the world's largest milk producer our outlays 
on milk were  by  far the highest in the agriculture budget. 
We  in the  Commission had  been warning  the Council of Minis-
ters about these dangerous  trends since  1980 butto no avail. 
However,  in 1983,  the price increase for milk  had already 
been abated as  a  result of the guarantee threshold being 
exceeded.  But despite this, milk production increased by 
4%  in 1983,  and  the Commission was  obliged to present the 
Council with a  stark choice  :  either a  drastic cut of  the 
order of  12%  in milk prices,  or the introduction of quotas 
to limit production and maintain prices at a  more  reason-
able  level.  Ministers  chose the latter and  fixed strict 
production quotas  for  5  years at something like  8  million 
tons  less than the  84  figure.  Harsh levies have  been in-
troduced for  any milk producer who  exceeds his assigned 
limit.  The  levy has  been set at 75%  and,  in some  cases, 
100%  of  the milk target price.  In other words,  totally 
dissuasive.  In addition,  prices have  been  frozen. 
:£hird,_PE_i_£e!?_: 
Price decisions were  adapted to the different market situ-
ation for the different products.  For example,  for  sugar 
the price was  frozen  and  for grains a  l%  cut was  applied. 
Overall,  farm prices for  the  1984/85 marketing year were 
cut by  ~% as expressed in the European  Currency Units, 
./. 
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14. compared with a  forecast general inflation rate of  5~%. 
And,  for  the first time  ever,  the Council's decisions 
meant that in national currencies there were  significant 
price reductions for a  number  of products in several 
Member  States.  In addition,  there will be an.intensifi-
cation of our efforts to narrow the gap  between our prices 
and  those of our competitors.  This will apply particularly 
to grain. 
Since in politics one  has  to tackle one  thing at a  time, 
the Commission  has made  no  secret of its plans to pro-
pose  for the 1985/86 marketing year meaningful cuts in 
grain prices following this year's  1%  cut.  The dairy 
farmers  caught it this year;  our cereal growers  know 
it is their turn next. 
Fo~rthL £o~~nit~ ~ref~r~nce~ 
This brings me  to an external aspect of the package 
which,  whilst only a  very small part of the whole,  seems 
to have attracted a  great deal of attention in the United 
States.  Since our own  farmers  are being asked to make 
considerable sacrifices and  to limit their production, 
the Commission feels that it is not unreasonable to review 
the treatment of competing  imports provided that this is 
done strictly in accordance with international trading rules. 
As  I  said earlier,  we  are aiming to narrow the gap 
between our grain prices and  those of our competitors.  Such 
a  move  will obviously have  the effect of making much  less 
·I. 
15. attractive all those grain substitutes which at present 
displace our own  feed grains and  have also contributed 
to surpluses in the dairy and  livestock sectors.  But 
until that time  and whilst we  are implementing  a  strict 
guarantee threshold and  requiring our grain producers to 
limit their own  production, it is absolutely essential to 
have  some  effective stabilisation of the  imports of grain 
substitutes,  such as  corn gluten feed.  Corn gluten feed 
is a  by-product of corn  sweetener manufacture,  the booming 
production of which in the u.s. is due in no  small part -
to protective import quotas  - who  would bet against them 
even 
being reduced/further this year - and  high priced internal 
arrangements enjoyed  by  US  sugar growers  and  of ethanol 
production encourage  by tax exemptions. 
Imports of  corn gluten feed  into the EC  have,  in fact, 
soared from  700,000 tons to 3.5 million tons since 1974. 
Our intention,  therefore,  for corn gluten feed is ~  to 
ban imports or reduce  them,  but to stabilise these imports 
16. 
after discussion with the EC's major suppliers against 
appropriate compensation on our part for any loss of growth -
and  in full accordance with the  GATT  rules. 
In other words,  we  are  looking for a  temporary breathing 
space  so as to avoid the risk of sabotage to our efforts 
to get our grain prices lower and to limit production. 
Such stabilisation should also help to reduce surpluses 
in the dairy and livestock sectors. 
./. However,  and  I  must stress this, what is being pro-
posed is ~  hasty unilateral action, ~  a  banning of all 
corn gluten imports nor  even a  reduction,  as one might 
gather from  the howls  of protest,  but what  we  hope will 
be  a  calm and reasoned negotiation aimed at temporary 
stabilisation with appropriate compensation and this only 
after fully carrying out the procedures laid down  in the 
GATT.  Two  meetings on this subject have already taken 
place in Geneva. 
Those briefly were  the tough decisions taken in 
Brussels at the end of March 1984,  but this was  not an 
instant rescue package and more hard decisions will have 
to be  taken. 
Nevertheless,  the  long-term prospects for control 
of agricultural policy and its expenditure have been  im-
proved.  The  Council has accepted three points of major 
importance  : 
First, the principle that agricultural guarantees can 
no longer be unlimited in nature.  Second,  an effective 
control of milk production by means  of quotas.  Third, 
a  tough price policy,  including  - for the first time  -
price cuts for several products in several countries. 
Meanwhile,  a  budgetary  framework is being evolved by the 
Community,  in which financial discipline for all policies, 
including agriculture,  will be  exercised. 
·-·-·  - --·~-··-~--------·-· ----
17. 
.;. But more  tough initiatives  will be  required in the 
coming years to continue  the rationalisation of 
agricultural policy on which the Community is now  embarked. 
It would  be  an illusion to suppose that our task is com-
pleted.  Nevertheless,  the CAP  is on the right path. 
France's Minister of Agriculture,  Michel  Rocard,  declared  : 
"The CAP  will remain at the centre of the Eurcpean 
construction, blt the benefits tmich it  gives to 
fazmers will perhaps no lcnger be so exclusive,  ••• 
• • • • • • • • • •  and  so un1.:im:i. ted, as in the past.  ltlat 
is neerled ncM, if the Eurcpean adventure is to con-
tinue, is far the construction of agricultural 
Emqle to be acx:atpani.ed by CXJtllal :p:>licies in the 
fields of iniustry, noney,  research and even defence." 
It is this recognition that agriculture - despite its dif-
ficulties,  and its differences from other sectors  - must 
be more  and more  integrated into Europe's economy,  and 
must find its place alongside other policies of the Commu-
nity,  that is perhaps the most important aspect of the 
decisions  recently taken on  the CAP. 
In conclusion,  I  must stress that these decisions, 
which are not an attempt to shuffle off our own  problems 
on to others but which represent an  important contribution 
towards  a  better balance of  supply and  demand  on world 
markets,  should be of benefit to  farmers  in all trading 
./. 
18. nations.  They  were not,  I  must emphasise,  taken purely for 
budgetary reasons,  but to fit our farming  to meet the changed 
economic circumstances of the mid  1980's and beyond. 
They will not lead to the dismantling of the CAP  nor to the 
disappearance of European  farm products  from world markets. 
We  are not,  in the words  of the poet Longfellow,  going to 
"fold our tents and  silently steal away".  You  can instead 
expect a  leaner,  more  streamlined European agriculture.  We 
have laid the foundation on which European agriculture can 
expand its potential. 
19. 
It seems to me,  therefore,  that there is all the more 
reason for each one of us to seek cooperation rather than 
conflict, particularly with the prospect of ever increasing 
yields around the world,  and  for the major exporters to 
strive to find  some  way  of enabling the hungry nations of 
the world to purchase this bounty.  The  EC,  whilst defending 
its own  interests, will be prepared - as it has been in the 
past - to search diligently with other trading nations for 
ways  of cooperating in the GATT  and  in other fora  such as 
the International Wheat  Council so as to promote world trade. 
And  here, it would  be helpful if the one-sided campaign 
directed against the Community  and its export subsidies 
was  stopped  and  replaced by a  more  constructive approach 
looking at the overall support given to agriculture by all 
major traders - whether this be via subsidies,  subsiqised 
credit,  internal aids or through  import restrictions. 
./. 
----------------------------------Since,  if we  don't seize the opportunity to cooperate openly 
and honestly,  we  shall all be  losers.  It is no  good  indivi-
dual nations trying to re-write the rules on their own. 
The  agreement  reached recently in Geneva  in the Committee 
of Agricultural Trade is an encouraging start.  But in trying 
to find  new  and  tougher rules for agricultural trade we  must 
avoid getting ourselves trapped in endless  semantic discus-
sion as to the difference between a  prohibition of export 
subsidies with carefully defined  exceptions of export sub-
sidies within carefully defined restrictions.  Let us  concen-
trate on getting our spending under control.  We  have  made 
a  painful start in the  EC  on milk  in particular and  with 
more  to come. 
Those  who  are not attracted to the far from easy but 
promising path of cooperation should bear in mind  the ghastly 
alternative of returning to a  situation which  resembles  that 
of the wastelands of  the 1930's with protectionism piled on 
more  protectionism.  I  hope  the recent closing of your  fron-
tiers to European pipes  and  tubes is not a  sign post pointing 
down  that dismal  road. 
But,  for  such cooperation and  for any other concerted 
measures,  we  shall need  considerable political will not 
only in Brussels and  Washington  but in capitals around  the 
world,  to achieve rules of conduct for agricultural trade 
which will benefit us all. 
.;. 
20. I  believe that if we  keep  cool and  bear in mind  what 
we  can  gain and what is at risk for  farmers  on the  banks  of 
the Missouri  and Mississipi as well as for those who  farm 
on  the  banks of the Loire and  the Rhine,  we  can together 
build a  more  secure  and  prosperous world  trading  system 
for  importer  and exporter alike. 
*  *  *  * 
7  Dec.  1984 
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21. 